But two other types of modally inflexible objects have been discussed, or suggested, in the recent literature, and they too threaten to crowd out familiar objects. The first are objects composed not of smallest parts at all, but of "atomless gunk", and what is brittle about them is that each necessarily is composed of just the particular mass of stuff (or "gunk") of which it in fact is composed. 12 Such objects may seem merely fanciful, but it has been argued that ontology cannot just take for granted that familiar objects such as people and statues are made up of smallest parts; we should have a position on whether there would be room in the world for such objects if it should turn out that the physical world is just extents of seamless stuff. 13 Finally, there are objects brittle in the sense that each necessarily has, at any given time, exactly the shape and size which in fact it then has. These brittle objects are modeled after, but different from, what Mark Heller calls "hunks". 14 "Hunks" are objects which do have temporal parts; so none is ever wholly present exactly where some familiar object is; so none ever threatens to crowd out a familiar object. But the whole essential nature of a "hunk" lies in the spatial character of each of its component stages, and this suggests a kind of brittle object which does pose a threat: objects which are wholly present at each moment of their existence, and have essentially, at each particular moment, exactly that shape and size which in fact they then have. Exactly where your recently reupholstered chair sits, for example, there would be such an object. The seat on your chair could have been thinner, at this very moment, by half an inch--and would have been, if the upholsterer had been stingy with the foam--but the contours of this object could not possibly have been different, now, from what in fact they are.
II
Might an object, in fact composed of just these particular parts, be necessarily composed of just these parts--might the composition be an essential property of the object? In the next section, I argue that the answer is No.
In the section after that, I confront the intuition that this the circumstances which we half-consciously envision, the only way for this table to go on being composed of some wood--or to have been, in the past, so composed--is for it to be (or to have been)
composed of this wood. This wood is not required, so to speak, "by name"--by virtue of its numerical identity--but by virtue of the special circumstances most readily envisioned. Different circumstances can easily be imagined, which cancel the intuition that composition by just this wood is necessary.
In the penultimate section I consider the three-dimensional analogues of "hunks"--objects which do not insist on having numerically the same composition as what they actually have, but do insist on having shapes and sizes qualitatively the same as those which, at each moment they exist, they in fact have. I
argue that no object can be essentially so characterized: the having, at such-and-such a time, of suchand-such a spatial extent is not part of an essential nature.
III
The idea that a material object might essentially be composed of just these (namely its actual) component parts--of all of them, or even of just a certain fraction of them--raises an ancient question. To what extent must the essential properties of an object be shared, or shareable, with other objects, and to what extent may they be peculiar to that object alone?
The first step towards a plausible answer, I suggest, is to note that each individual object will have some properties that are peculiar to it--that set it apart from other objects the same in kind--and that some of these distinguishing properties will be merely contingent ones. Each object will have properties peculiar to it, if only because of the principle that no two objects can, at a time, occupy exactly the same place. In addition to spatio-temporal peculiarities, moreover, we commonly find that individual objects--especially the medium-sized objects recognized by common sense--differ qualitatively, if not from all other objects of the same general kind, at least from many. But of the properties that mark off a given individual object from others of its general kind, at least some must be reckoned merely contingent. For regarding them all as necessary threatens to leave no room in the world for properties had just contingently; if there is contingency in the world at all, it is to be found, one would think, in the peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of individual objects. And most philosophers would suppose--contra Spinoza and Leibniz--that the very idea of a property had with necessity requires, for its sense, the contrast of properties had just contingently.
At least some of the properties that distinguish a given object from others similar to it, then, will be properties which the given object merely happens to have. Might others of its distinguishing properties be essential to it? What exactly is the difference between a property by virtue of which a particular object just happens to differ from other similar objects, and a property by which it differs essentially from the others? A large part of the answer, I contend, is that a property by virtue of which an object differs essentially from others is a property with which other properties, that likewise distinguish the given object from those others, reliably cluster together. In other words, a given object differs essentially from certain others only if it differs in a way that matters--in a way that brings other differences in its train.
One argument for this position is pragmatic. The whole point of telling someone that A's which have F do not just happen to differ from (some or many) other A's, but differ essentially from those other A's, is to alert her to the fact that A's which have F are special in ways beyond just their having F--there are inductions which can reliably by run over them, which cannot be run over A's in general.
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A different argument derives from a particular view about the nature of properties and of kinds.
According to this view, any genuine property is flanked by its own proper contraries--by properties incompatible with it, which contrast with it to greater and lesser (but commensurable) degrees. The question with which this section began was how closely the essential properties of an individual object can cling to it alone, how widely they must be shared or shareable with other objects.
We have discovered no particular limit to how idiosyncratic, how peculiar to it alone, an object's essential properties can be. But we have now found reasons to think that any distinctive or peculiar property essential to an individual object must go together with yet other properties, which likewise distinguish that object from other similar ones.
Can it be essential to any individual object, then, that it be composed of just these (namely, its actual) parts, and no others? Put differently: can it be incompatible with any object's essential nature that it should be composed of parts numerically different from its actual ones, even in the case where the different parts are qualitatively identical with the actual ones? Only if, it would seem, the object's being composed of just these (numerically identified) parts will bring other equally distinctive properties in its train. But that is simply unthinkable. Whatever the properties which an object's composition underlies, and however it underlies them--however the laws of nature work--it is the qualitative character of an object's composition that enables it to underlie the other properties. Qualitatively the same parts, qualitatively the same object. The laws of nature, after all, are indifferent to merely numerical difference: they lay hold of objects by grabbing at the qualities, and on objects (or parts) that are qualitatively just alike, they act in just the same way. Where they determine what will happen to one individual object rather than to others intrinsically just like it, they do so by latching onto extrinsic or relational features of that individual object, in principle repeatable in the case of other individuals. All This same line of thought shows, it would seem, that no individual material object can necessarily be composed of just this mass of atomless stuff, rather than any other mass qualitatively just alike.
IV
But what of the idea, which a suitably framed example can readily make plausible, that many material objects depend, for their identity over time, on the identity over time of the stuff or the particles that compose them--if not of all the stuff or all the particles, then at least of some? For surely any object must go on being itself, if it is go on being at all. This is true even if an object's numerical identity is no part of its essential nature--even if an "essential nature" is a matter of qualitative features, in principle repeatable in other instances. It is true even if there is, out there in the world, no such property as selfidentity. 19 For whatever its truth-makers may be, the assertion that a particular object is itself, and is the same object as existed and will exist at all the different phases of its career, must be true of any object.
And if its truth, concerning any one material object T, consists in the fact that T steadfastly is composed of (all, or at least mainly) just those parts, and no others, however similar--or of just that mass of atomless stuff, and no other, however similar--then the argument of the previous section proves far too much. It will after all be true of T that it necessarily is composed of (all, or at least mainly) just those parts, just that stuff.
Against this objection, my response will be that though the identity over time of many material objects may, depending on the circumstances, require or entail that they are composed continuously of numerically the same parts, it never just consists in that fact. For different circumstances can always be envisioned, in which the identity over time of those same objects permits (or even requires) that they be, at different times, composed of numerically different parts. Since those same material objects could exist in those different circumstances, it never is true of them that they necessarily are composed of just those parts, or that stuff.
But let us begin with a suitably framed example. Before me is a large wooden I conclude that the diagnosis I earlier offered is right. The intuition that this table necessarily is composed of this wood responds to, but distorts, the fact that this table is now composed of wood--is now in fact composed of wood, but not necessarily so composed. And why do we have that intuition at all?
For much the same reason why it initially seems intuitive that the standard meter bar in Paris necessarily is one meter long. We fix the reference of "this But Burke's solution would seem vulnerable on two accounts. First, how can it be that some real objects have specific persistence conditions in consequence of satisfying "piece of copper" (or "aggregate of copper"), while other real objects, which satisfy exactly those sortals, have different persistence conditions instead? The switch seems to fight with the very meaning of "in consequence of". Second, does it really make sense to think of a real object's capacities to last through changes, and its vulnerabilities to destruction, as being determined by how language latches on to it? Wouldn't any piece of copper have had the same persistence conditions if languages had contained no such sortal as "piece of copper", or even if there had been no languages at all? 28 Dean Zimmerman offers no finished solution, but advises that the best prospects for saving the reality of familiar objects lie in a "mixed-category" account of how they are constituted by masses.
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That is, familiar objects must be regarded as logical constructions out of a world composed fundamentally of brittle objects, or as "disturbances" moving through brittle objects (as a hurricane is a "disturbance" which moves through masses of air). But the "logical construction" account offers little comfort, as Zimmerman recognizes: "if my body is just a function from times to places, then...a function jumping randomly from, say, the metal in the Eiffel Tower at one moment to the sugar in my coffee at
another is no less 'real', no less a 'persisting thing'". 30 And the suggestion that my chair, or my boat, is just a "process" or a "disturbance" is no less unsettling: for one thing, I would ask (though Zimmerman What does it matter whether this chunk of gold will have continued to exist, under these or those circumstances, or whether it will have been replaced by something else? What properties will this chunk of gold reliably, indeed inevitably, drag with it as it wends its way through time and space?
This is an important question to spotlight because it is easy to give overly hasty answers to it.
Here is one way: such-and-such features are the ones I count on to flag or mark out the continued existence of this chunk of gold; therefore such-and-such are properties which this chunk of gold will have, on pain of ceasing to exist at all. -That's a bad inference. [I might flag the continued existence of this man by the feature, being the teacher of Alexander the Great.] Another way: the dictum "this chunk of gold is this chunk of gold" cannot fail to be true, whenever asserted; therefore there's a property, distinctive of just this chunk of gold, which this chunk has necessarily. That's also a bad inference.
The point is that we have a practice, a language game, of saying when a given chunk of stuff has continued to exist, and when it has been replaced by something else. But it's overly hasty to assume that this practice limns reality, or reports a fact-or at least, that it reports exactly that fact it seems to.
Where context defines what counts as being the same chunk as containing exactly 70% or more of the original atoms-where we're really dealing with a type-2 parcel-then the practice does have the function of tracing a fact, where such-and-such atoms are. Where context leaves no particular content to what counts as the same chunk, the situation is different. Here talk of "the same chunk" probably doesn't function to collect history-facts about an individual; it functions to collect quantity-facts about a stuff, gold. Thus one might say, "have we lost some of our gold? Is all the same gold still here? Gold is, after all, expensive!" being "the same chunk of stone" does limn a fact (speaking from the standpoint of these questioners), but not the fact it seems to.
Footnotes
for example, is composed of a mass of swing-stuff (68). I think that this abuses our actual common-sense concept of what a stuff is, and that that concept should be protected--it is of some use for science. One criterion for stuffhood we go by, for example, is homogeneity at the level of small parts--a criterion naturally and usefully sharpened, for scientific purposes, as homogeneity on the molecular level. See also the second-to-last paragraph in section V, in the text below. 6 In addition to the articles by Zimmerman and Burke mentioned so far, see also Burke's "Dion and
Theon: an Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle," Journal of Philosophy, 91 (1994), 129-39.
Another important recent paper is Michael C. Rea, "The Problem of Material Constitution,"
Philosophical Review, 104 (1995), 525-52. Rea is more concerned to taxonomize solutions to the puzzle than to recommend one or another, but he shows far more receptiveness to the ontological assumptions I mention (for a discussion of them, see section I) than would have been typical fifteen years ago, when "sortal dependency" solutions such as Wiggins' dominated the literature.
7 Even Rea's. To see this, one must dig a bit beneath the text. What Rea says is that denying the existence of aggregates (which, for him, are the paradigm brittle objects) does little to solve "the problem of material constitution" unless one is willing also to deny, across the board, the "Principle of Alternative
Compositional Possibilities" (PACP)--the principle that where particles compose an object bearing one modal relation to its constituents, the same particles compose a different object bearing a different modal relation to its constituents (530, n.). What Rea fails to see is that the opponent of brittle objects would love to deny the PACP. For the opponent takes the point of departure, for the PACP, to be familiar objects: he takes the PACP to assert that where particles compose an object (e.g., a ship) which can lose some of its particles, they also compose an object (e.g., an aggregate of wood) which can't. But Rea is so sure there are some brittle objects that he takes them to be the point of departure for the PACP; see 530-31 and 550.
